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In 2014, voters in ten of the fifteen states previously covered by the 
Voting Rights Act1 (“VRA”) preclearance formula—including six of the nine 
states covered in their entirety—will go to the polls to elect or retain state 
supreme court justices. Yet despite the endemic underrepresentation of 
minorities on state benches and the judiciary’s traditional role in fighting 
discrimination, scholars have seemingly paid little attention to how Shelby 
County v. Holder’s2 suspension of the coverage formula in section 4(b)3 has 
left racial minorities vulnerable to retrogressive changes to judicial-election 
laws. The first election year following Shelby County thus provides a 
compelling opportunity to assess the VRA’s ongoing role in the fight to 
diversify state benches. 
Judicial elections have long raised unique conceptual hurdles for 
proponents of expansive VRA protections. For instance, throughout the first 
three decades of VRA litigation, many lower courts appeared persuaded by 
the argument that, because judges are not supposed to be responsive to 
specific constituencies, they must fall outside of the VRA’s reach. It was not 
until the 1990s that the Supreme Court effectively held that the VRA was 
applicable to judicial elections,4 and even then it took multiple lawsuits to 
establish that the law covered trial as well as appellate elections, and that it 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, December 2015, University of Michigan Law School. I would like to 
thank Professors Bridget Mary McCormack and Ellen D. Katz for their encouragement and 
feedback, as well as the Michigan Law Review staff for their consideration and diligence 
throughout the editing process. 
 1. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 438 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973–1973bb-1 (2012)). 
 2. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
 3. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b). 
 4. The Court held judicial elections to be within the VRA’s scope in Haith v. Martin, 
477 U.S. 901 (1986), a summary affirmance that left substantial questions open for the Court to 
address in cases such as Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991) and Brooks v. State Board of 
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covered retention as well as ordinary elections.5 To this day, the Court has 
not extended the “one-person, one-vote” principle to judicial elections under 
the equal protection clause, even though it has done so for legislative 
elections. 
More generally, debates on the virtues of judicial elections tend to frame 
judicial quality in terms of administrative outcomes while ignoring the 
consequences of racially discriminatory voting laws on the makeup of 
elected state benches.6 As this Essay argues, however, the VRA and 
antidiscrimination law more broadly make clear that effective minority 
political participation in state judicial elections is an equally relevant subject 
in this debate. More specifically, the VRA—and section 57 preclearance in 
particular—has played an overlooked role in the parallel struggles to 
diversify the nation’s state benches and mitigate racially discriminatory 
election laws. Previously covered states, such as North Carolina, Texas, and 
Alabama, have already vindicated critics’ concerns about retrogression by 
promising to enact more stringent voting laws that the Department of Justice 
(“DOJ”) and the D.C. District Court surely would have objected to under a 
preclearance regime.8 Some of these new laws, such as those rearranging or 
eliminating judicial positions, directly target judicial elections. Meanwhile, 
other laws that enact voter ID requirements and reduce the number of early 
voting days will undermine minority voters’ ability to participate in the 
elections. In sum, this Essay argues, while Congress considers drafting a new 
coverage formula at a time when courts are construing voting remedies even 
 
 5. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 902 F.2d 
293, 305 (5th Cir. 1990) (Higginbotham, J.) (arguing that “the county-wide election of district 
court judges does not violate the Voting Rights Act” because there can be no share of power in 
single-member offices such as Texas trial courts). See African-American Voting Rights Legal 
Defense Fund v. Missouri, 994 F. Supp. 1105 (E.D. Mo. 1997) and Bradley v. Work, 154 F.3d 
704 (7th Cir. 1998) for a comprehensive discussion of the VRA and retention elections. Even 
some scholars do not consider retention elections to be a true form of judicial elections. See 
Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 689, 791 (1995) (categorizing retention-election systems as nonelective). 
 6. See Jeffrey M. Chemerinsky & Jonathan L. Williams, Foreword: Measuring Judges 
and Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1173 (2009); Stephen J. Choi et al., Judicial Evaluations and 
Information Forcing: Ranking State High Courts and Their Judges, 58 DUKE L.J. 1313 (2009); 
Stephen J. Choi et al., Professionals or Politicians: The Uncertain Empirical Case for an Elected 
Rather than Appointed Judiciary, 26 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 290 (2010). 
 7. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. 
 8. See NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, HOW FORMERLY COVERED STATES & 
LOCALITIES ARE RESPONDING TO THE SUPREME COURT’S VOTING RIGHTS ACT DECISION 







September 2014] Judicial Diversity After Shelby County v. Holder 153 
more narrowly, few statutory remedies exist to diversify state courts and 
combat discrimination precisely where such tools are needed most. 
This Essay proceeds in three parts. Part I outlines the current state of 
judicial diversity throughout the country, tracing the story of judicial 
diversity back through the pre-VRA era. Part II then explains how the VRA’s 
legal architecture helped facilitate the election of minority judges. 
Specifically, Part II addresses the preclearance program’s unique 
effectiveness with respect to racial diversity and discrimination in the 
context of judicial elections. Finally, Part III argues that the nullification of 
the VRA preclearance requirement represents an alarming setback for 
judicial diversification efforts, especially in light of the Court’s narrow 
construction of section 2 vote-dilution claims. 
I. RACIAL DIVERSITY IN STATE COURTS 
State courts hear approximately 90% of the judicial system’s cases, and 
just shy of 90% of all state-court judges run for election or retention.9 
Meanwhile, white males are overrepresented on state appellate benches by a 
ratio of two to one.10 With respect to black judges, there is actually evidence 
of a proportional backslide in recent years.11 It comes as no surprise, then, 
that bar associations and groups such as the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil 
Rights Under the Law focus a great deal on diversifying state benches. The 
arguments for a more diverse judiciary extend well beyond the symbolic 
importance of representation to substantive, performance-related concerns. 
For instance, empirical analysis suggests that minority judges are more 
plaintiff friendly, a generalization that holds true even controlling for 
partisan selection and election processes.12 Obviously, there are strong 
connections between the processes of judicial selection and substantive racial 
justice. Even if all the responsiveness concerns that apply to legislators do 
not apply to judges, there are many functional arguments for why judicial 
diversity is desirable. 
The period of outright racial disenfranchisement that began with 
Redemption and ultimately inspired Congress to enact the 1965 VRA is well 
known and difficult to exaggerate. An onslaught of racist voting laws 
eviscerated minority political opportunity in the South, and the 
 
 9. AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y FOR LAW AND POLICY, JUSTICE AT RISK: AN EMPIRICAL 
ANALYSIS OF CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS 1 (June 2013), available at 
http://www.acslaw.org/ACS%20Justice%20at%20Risk%20(FINAL)%206_10_13.pdf. 
 10. CIARA TORRES-SPELLISCY ET AL., BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, IMPROVING 
JUDICIAL DIVERSITY 1 (2d ed. 2010). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Seth S. Andersen, Diversity on the Bench: Is the ‘Wise Latina’ a Myth?, 93 
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repercussions are still evident today. In Georgia, for example, not a single 
black candidate won statewide office until 1984, when voters elected Robert 
Benham to the court of appeals, and even then a white governor had first 
appointed him to the bench.13 That same year, Mississippi had just 1 black 
trial judge out of 102.14 In 1990, Virginia had a minority voting-age 
population close to 20%, but minorities occupied a mere 5% of elected 
judicial positions.15 When plaintiffs in Harris County, the most populous 
county in Texas, sued to establish VRA coverage of trial-court elections in 
1991, the county was 20% black, but its at-large elections yielded only 3 black 
judges for 59 district-wide seats.16 Even in 2001, of the 10 states with the 
worst judicial diversity as measured by disparity between voting-age 
population and percentage of minority judges, 8 were covered by the VRA’s 
preclearance mandate and 9 were states with judicial elections.17 
Yet currently, in the aggregate, previously covered states have a slightly 
higher percentage of minority judges (13.7%) than previously noncovered 
states (12%).18 (This is less surprising given that the overwhelming majority 
of VRA preclearance activity has affected jurisdictions with substantial 
minority populations.) By contrast, in 1965, when President Johnson signed 
the VRA, state courts were almost exclusively white. Slow but discernible 
progress has therefore been achieved—progress that Shelby County may yet 
undo. 
II. VOTING RIGHTS ACT LITIGATION AND JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 
Prior to Shelby County, sections 219 and 520 constituted the VRA’s tag 
team of antidiscrimination provisions. Section 2 provides that “[n]o voting 
 
 13. Laughlin McDonald et al., Georgia, in QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE 
IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 1965–1990, at 67 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard 
Grofman eds., 1994). 
 14. See Robert B. McDuff, Judicial Elections and the Voting Rights Act, 38 LOY. L. REV. 
931, 933 (1993). 
 15. Thomas R. Morris & Neil Bradley, Virginia, in QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: 
THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 1965–1990, at 271, 286 (Chandler Davidson & 
Bernard Grofman eds., 1994). 
 16. Hous. Lawyers’ Ass’n v. Attorney Gen. of Tex., 501 U.S. 419, 423 (1991). 
 17. Barbara L. Graham, Toward an Understanding of Judicial Diversity in American 
Courts, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 153, 173–74 (2004). 
 18. Diversity of the Bench, AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, 
http://www.judicialselection.com/judicial_selection/bench_diversity/index.cfm?state= (last 
visited Aug. 16, 2014); National Database on Judicial Diversity in State Courts, AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION STANDING COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE (June 2010), 
http://apps.americanbar.org/abanet/jd/display/national.cfm. 
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qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure 
shall be imposed . . . in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of 
the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or 
color,” such that, “based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the 
political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political 
subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a [given 
race].”21 Section 2, in short, allows for plaintiffs to challenge discriminatory 
laws. But it does not preclude the enactment of such laws. That prophylactic 
function is left to section 5. 
Section 5, for its part, mandates that jurisdictions covered either by 
section 4(b)’s22 formula—which was held unconstitutional in Shelby 
County—or section 3(c)’s23 bail-in “pocket-trigger” must preclear “any 
voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or 
procedure.”24 If covered jurisdictions do not preclear such changes, plaintiffs 
can sue for failure to comply and receive a court-ordered injunction. Threats 
of section 2 litigation and DOJ objections under section 5 have been a major 
force behind much of the progressive reform in covered jurisdictions.25 
Even though racial minorities were just as grossly underrepresented in 
state judiciaries as they were in state legislatures before the civil rights 
movement, the VRA was not initially deployed to attack racially 
discriminatory judicial elections.26 Two historical facts help explain the 
VRA’s partial dormancy in the early fight to diversify state benches. These 
facts also underscore why Shelby County raises fresh concerns. 
First, before Congress amended section 2 in 1982, that section was 
considered to be coextensive with the Fifteenth Amendment’s purposeful 
discrimination standard.27 Without a results-based approach, it was difficult 
to remedy even egregiously disparate racial impacts. Second, although DOJ 
used its preclearance authority under section 5 to object to around a dozen 
 
 20. Id. § 1973c. 
 21. Id. § 1973. 
 22. Id. § 1973b(b). 
 23. Id. § 1973a(c). 
 24. Id. § 1973c. 
 25. ANITA S. EARLS ET AL., RENEWTHEVRA.ORG, VOTING RIGHTS IN NORTH CAROLINA: 
1982–2006, at 2 (2006), available at 
http://www.protectcivilrights.org/pdf/voting/NorthCarolinaVRA.pdf. See generally Robert A. 
Kengle, Report: Voting Rights in Georgia: 1982–2006, 17 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 367 
(2008). 
 26. See McDuff, supra note 14, at 935.  
 27. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62 (1980) (“action by a State that is racially 
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proposed changes to judicial elections between 1965 and 1989,28 the 
Supreme Court had not definitively held that the VRA was applicable to 
judicial elections. 
The Supreme Court eventually had to resolve these ambiguities. In the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, lawsuits were filed in a dozen states using at-large 
voting schemes to elect state judges, which forced the Court to decide 
whether the VRA applied to judicial elections. In Brooks v. Georgia State 
Board of Elections, the Court unanimously affirmed29 a decision from the 
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Georgia holding that the 
VRA was applicable to judicial elections.30 At trial, the district court had 
emphasized that “[s]ection 5 of the Voting Rights Act does not differentiate 
among types of elections.”31 Then, two years after Brooks, the Supreme Court 
in Chisom v. Roemer addressed the slightly trickier question of whether 
section 2 covers judicial elections.32 
Section 2 presented a more complicated question in two respects. First, 
unlike section 5, section 2 expressly refers to minority opportunity to elect 
“representatives of their choice.”33 Moreover, section 2 claims do not benefit 
from the antiretrogression principle that underlies section 5. Still, Justice 
Stevens argued in Chisom that section 2, which was amended in 1982 to bar 
electoral practices and systems that result—intentionally or otherwise—in 
the denial or abridgement of the right to vote, does indeed cover judicial 
elections.34 
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy, 
dissented from Justice Stevens’s majority opinion. In particular, Justice Scalia 
argued that “judges are not representatives,”35 and he added that, although 
judges may be elected, they do not “act[] on behalf of the people . . . in the 
ordinary sense.”36 Justice Scalia also invoked Wells v. Edwards,37 which held 
that the Fourteenth Amendment’s one-person, one-vote mandate does not 
 
 28. Section 5 Objection Letters, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/records/vot/obj_letters/index.php (last visited Sept. 1, 2014). 
 29. 498 U.S. 916 (1990). 
 30. 775 F. Supp 1470 (S.D. Ga. 1989). 
 31. Brooks, 775 F. Supp at 1476. 
 32. 501 U.S. 380 (1991). 
 33. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2012). 
 34. Chisom, 501 U.S. at 384. 
 35. Id. at 405 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 36. Id. at 410 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). 
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apply to the judiciary,38 to argue that extending section 2 liability to judicial 
cases would create a problematic jurisprudential rift.39 But this argument 
misses the mark. If anything, Congress chose to use representatives not in 
lieu of officials but in place of legislators, the term the Court used in White v. 
Regester.40 Indeed, there is ample evidence that the authors of the VRA 
contemplated its application to judicial elections,41 and Chisom signaled that 
the Court would apply the VRA to judicial cases accordingly. 
Brooks and Chisom spurred a period of robust federal oversight of 
judicial elections, even though section 5 objections have actually declined 
since 1993.42 Every time a jurisdiction sought to change the number of its 
judicial seats, the location of those seats, or the manner in which elections 
for those seats were conducted, DOJ scrutinized the plan while comparing it 
to viable alternatives and examining its social context. In one typical 
objection letter, DOJ wrote to Alabama authorities in 1993 arguing that the 
state’s plan to add a judicial position in the Sixth Judicial Circuit that would 
be selected by majority vote in an at-large election failed section 5’s 
antiretrogression test.43 Even though Alabama claimed a nondiscriminatory 
interest in reducing each judge’s caseload, DOJ contended that the choice of 
an at-large, numbered-post election needlessly deprived black voters of an 
equal opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice. Indeed, as the 
department noted, such an electoral system was likely to deter minority 
candidates from running in much the same way that they had been deterred 
in the past. Similarly, when Texas submitted its plan for the governor to fill 
judicial vacancies by appointment rather than special election, DOJ objected 
to the plan, arguing that, given the state’s history of judicial 
underrepresentation of minorities and racial bloc voting, there was a high 
probability that the gubernatorial appointment process would yield a judge 
 
 38. Edwards, 347 F. Supp. at 454; see Andrew S. Marovitz, Casting a Meaningful Ballot: 
Applying One-Person, One-Vote to Judicial Elections Involving Racial Discrimination, 98 YALE 
L.J. 1193, 1194–95 (1989); McDuff, supra note 14, at 935. 
 39. Chisom, 501 U.S. at 415–16 (Scalia, J., dissenting); McDuff, supra note 14, at 971. 
 40. 412 U.S. 755 (1973); Brenda Wright, The Bench and the Ballot: Applying the 
Protections of the Voting Rights Act to Judicial Elections, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 669, 677 (1992). 
 41. See Brooks v. State Bd. of Elections, 775 F. Supp 1470, 1476 (S.D. Ga. 1989), aff’d, 
498 U.S. 916 (1990). 
 42. THE NAT’L COMM’N ON THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT AT 
WORK 1982–2005, at 65 (2006) (suggesting that Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board, 528 U.S. 
320 (2000), led to a decline in section 5 objections between 2000 and 2004), available at 
http://www.lawyerscommittee.org/admin/voting_rights/documents/files/0023.pdf. 
 43. Letter from James P. Turner, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, to Lynda K. Oswald, Assistant Attorney Gen., Ala. State House (Nov. 16, 
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unacceptable to Hispanic voters.44 Between 1990 and 2013, DOJ issued 
dozens of such objections to judicial elections, on top of the hundreds it 
issued in response to more general voter laws.45 By disallowing electoral laws 
that were potentially retrogressive, as opposed to merely overturning laws 
proven to have a discriminatory impact, the VRA advanced judicial 
diversity. 
Yet as an ongoing case in Galveston County, Texas, perfectly illustrates, 
Shelby County leaves the door open for legislatures to erode the progress 
made in the past two decades. In August 2011, Galveston officials adopted 
and submitted for DOJ review a comprehensive judicial reform that, among 
other things, reduced the number of justices of the peace from nine to five 
and the number of constable precincts from eight to five.46 Concurrently, 
minority plaintiffs mounted a lawsuit against Galveston under sections 2 and 
5 of the VRA.47 The plaintiffs alleged that, prior to the county’s plan, black 
and Hispanic voters were able to elect candidates of their choice in three of 
those precincts—the same three targeted for consolidation in the 2011 plan. 
In its careful review of census data, public testimony, and the county’s 
proffered justifications, DOJ reached the same conclusion, and in March 
2012 it denied preclearance to the Galveston plan.48 
On August 19, 2013, less than two months after Shelby County was 
decided, Galveston enacted virtually the same plan that DOJ had determined 
to be retrogressive, thereby eliminating the opportunity for minority voters 
to elect justices of the peace in all but one precinct.49 Minority plaintiffs have 
brought a new section 2 suit against Galveston, but they will have to make 
out a vote-dilution claim without reference to retrogression. Moreover, the 
fact that the Galveston case pertains to justice-of-the-peace courts with 
limited jurisdiction merely reinforces the importance of a robust protection 
scheme going forward. Previously covered states such as Texas tend to hold 
many more elections for courts of limited jurisdiction—for which voting 
 
 44. Letter from Bill Lann Lee, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, to the Honorable Alberto R. Gonzales, Elections Div., Tex. Sec’y of State (Sept. 
29, 1998), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/records/vot/obj_letters/letters/TX/l_980929.pdf. 
 45.  See Section 5 Objection Letters, supra note 28. 
 46. Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice, to James E. Trainor III, Attorney, Beirne, Maynard & Parsons LLP (Mar. 5, 2012), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/records/vot/obj_letters/letters/TX/l_120305.pdf. 
 47. Complaint, Petteway v. Galveston Cnty., No. 3:13-cv-308 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2013), 
available at http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1004771/petteway-et-al-v-galveston-
county-texas-et-al.pdf. 
 48. Letter from Thomas E. Perez, supra note 46. 
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districts are smaller and minority opportunity to elect therefore better—than 
for courts of general jurisdiction. 
 
III. WHY SECTION 2 CANNOT FILL SHELBY COUNTY’S PRECLEARANCE GAP 
Before Shelby County, the VRA statutory regime was truly greater than 
the sum of its parts. Mandatory preclearance served a vital burden-shifting 
role that enabled minority plaintiffs strategically to triage electoral 
discrimination and guaranteed that subsequent policies did not undo the 
progress made through section 2.50 Furthermore, while voting rights 
litigation frequently involves pitched battles between state legislatures and 
minority plaintiffs, preclearance provided a structured, deliberative process 
for states and municipalities to negotiate solutions with the federal 
government. In short, section 5’s antiretrogression function worked hand in 
hand with section 2’s antidilution victories. While plaintiffs can therefore 
still pursue section 2 vote-dilution claims, Shelby County greatly reduced 
their ability to keep up with discriminatory policies. 
In addition, the future of section 2 itself remains uncertain. Recent cases 
such as Bartlett v. Strickland51 signal the Supreme Court’s resistance to 
further expanding section 2’s scope to tackle twenty-first-century modes of 
discrimination. In Bartlett, the Court held that, in order to make out a 
section 2 vote-dilution claim, plaintiffs must show that they would comprise 
at least 50% of a proposed new district.52 Consequently, in many cases where 
states and municipalities decide to eliminate or relocate judgeships—just as 
Galveston did—section 2 may not provide a remedy. It was simply not 
engineered to be able to pick up section 5’s slack. 
After Shelby County, then, VRA remedies to correct racial 
discrimination in judicial elections are available primarily in jurisdictions 
that still use at-large voting schemes or similar procedures that submerge 
minority votes. For instance, plaintiffs in Terrebonne Parish, Louisiana, filed 
a lawsuit in February 2014, alleging that the at-large system used to elect five 
judges for the Thirty-Second Judicial District (coextensive with Terrebonne 
Parish) violates section 2.53 Under the system, judicial candidates do not 
need to be residents of a given division within the district and are only 
 
 50. THE NAT’L COMM’N ON THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, supra note 42; see also EARLS ET 
AL., supra note 25, at 2. 
 51. 556 U.S. 1 (2009). 
 52. Id. at 25–26. 
 53. Complaint ¶¶ 32–34, Terrebonne Parish Branch NAACP v. Jindal, No. 3:13-cv-69 
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required to live there for one year prior to running. The results of 
Terrebonne’s system are astounding. Black residents comprise over 17.3% of 
the district’s total voting-age population, but in Terrebonne’s 191-year 
judicial history, not a single black judge has been elected.54 Terrebonne 
voters are simply arguing that the structure of their judicial elections should 
not discriminatorily silence their voice, especially in a situation where their 
population size indicates that they are strong enough to wield political 
power. Despite the Shelby County majority’s insistence that the preclearance 
formula’s “strong medicine” can no longer be justified by the same 
“entrenched racial discrimination” that inspired the VRA, there is clearly 
more work to be done.55 
CONCLUSION 
Judicial elections and the VRA raise enormously complex questions and 
provoke serious debate on the topics of race consciousness and political 
accountability. This Essay has humbly attempted to advance that debate by 
pointing out the significance of the Supreme Court’s evolving VRA 
jurisprudence for elected judiciaries. But the Essay has avoided opining on 
which judicial-selection process is best, in part because the VRA and the 
suspension of its coverage formula remain highly relevant to the future 
protection of minority interests regardless of what kind of system is in place. 
There is no question that it is not the VRA’s responsibility to deliver wholly 
proportional racial representation in the legislative and judicial branches. 
And yet the statute remains an essential tool in defending each voter’s equal 
opportunity to participate politically and elect candidates of his or her 
choice. History suggests that, after Shelby County, the absence of a robust 
preclearance mechanism not only threatens to disenfranchise minority 




 54. Id. ¶¶ 11, 28. 
 55.  133 S. Ct. 2612, 2618 (2013). 
